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SYSTEMIC EFFICIENCIES IN COMPETITION LAW: EVIDENCE 
FROM THE ICT INDUSTRY 
 
Konstantinos Stylianou* 
 
JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS (FORTHCOMING) 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article introduces the concept of systemic efficiencies, traces its theoretical underpinnings in economics, 
management and technology, and applies it to recent high profile cases. Systemic efficiencies occur in large 
complex systems through the interaction of multiple distributed components, a process which is commonly 
coordinated by an entity that can exercise pervasive control over the V\VWHP¶V components and their 
interactions. This type of extensive control can manifest itself as potentially anticompetitive practices, like 
tying, refusal to deal and full line forcing, causing the reaction of competition authorities. However, at the same 
time, systemic efficiencies can have significant benefits that cannot be generated by smaller scale, simpler, 
more isolated efficiencies, and are therefore of great interest to society, and of high redeeming value as antitrust 
defence to the introducing entities. To demonstrate how systemic efficiencies and their benefits materialize in 
practice this article also discusses two series of cases: the recent IBM mainframes cases in the US and the US, 
and the ongoing Google Android cases in the US and the EU. Both cases belong in the ICT industry, which is 
frequently said to consist of paradigmatic examples of large complex systems that can give rise to systemic 
efficiencies. 
 
JEL: K21, L12, L22, L41, L52, L96, O31, O33 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In a series of ongoing and recent high-profile cases the EU and the US have launched investigations against large 
companies like Google and IBM for practices that allegedly hinder competition in their respective markets.1 A 
common tKHPHLQDOORIWKHVHFDVHVKDVEHHQWKHSRWHQWLDOO\H[FOXVLRQDU\HIIHFWRIWKHVHFRPSDQLHV¶SUDFWLFHV
namely that they may have prevented competitors from developing products and services that rely on inputs from 
these firms. As expected, Google and IBM have defended their behaviour by invoking, among others, efficiencies, 
which²they claim²turn out to the benefit of consumers.  
For anyone studying competition law, it is fairly uncontroversial that proving and quantifying efficiencies 
is notoriously difficult. Indeed, there are hardly any EU cases that were saved on the grounds of efficiencies, and 
only a few in the US (with the exception perhaps of merger cases).2 However, efficiencies play a key function in 
competition law since they highlight the value of progress and innovation even in the presence of anticompetitive 
effects, and provide competition authorities a means to make good policy by tolerating certain anticompetitive 
actions when these are offset by procompetitive effects.3 This is even truer when the efficiency in question is 
substantial and can have far-reaching implications for the shape of the industry.  
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Along those lines, this article aims to introduce a type of efficiencies²systemic efficiencies²which occur 
in large complex systems and which are qualitatively different from smaller scale, simpler, more isolated 
efficiencies, even if those are highly valuable or novel. The ICT industry is often brought as a paradigmatic 
example of an industry that exhibits the characteristics of large complex systems,4 and it will provide herein many 
of the examples and cases that will illustrate the nature and value of systemic efficiencies. By introducing systemic 
efficiencies, tracing their characteristics as they emerge from a synthesis of economics, management and 
technology studies, and applying them to high-profile cases in the ICT sector, this article attempts to help 
authorities and regulators identify and assess the true dimensions of practices that can have sweeping effects in 
their respective industries. 
Systemic efficiencies involve and affect multiple and dispersed parts of large complex systems whose 
components are intricately interconnected in a way that changes in one part may trigger readjustments in other 
parts (examples of such systems can be electronic communications networks and operating system ecosystems).  
Because they draw from multiple parts, they require a holistic overview of the system in which they are 
interwoven, which makes them harder to identify and appreciate. However, at the same time, the fact that they are 
so integrative and extensive means that they can bring about dramatic innovations in the industry, such that would 
not occur at a smaller scale or insular environments. Systemic efficiencies and innovations, therefore, generate 
unique value both to the introducing firm and to the industry as a whole, and deserve to be identified as a distinct 
type of efficiency. 
Even when correctly identified, the challenge systemic efficiencies pose is that they often emerge through 
and because of pervasive control over the system&RQWUROUHIHUVWRILUPV¶GHFLVLRQVDVWRKRZ they shape their 
production process by defining boundaries, picking certain partners over others, and determining the architecture 
of the system. In that sense, control serves as the focusing mechanism that brings together the various parts 
(internal and external to the firm) implicated in the systemic efficiency. The problem is that to achieve this kind 
of pervasive control, the system architect may need to resort to potentially exclusionary practices, such as refusal 
to supply, tying, discrimination and others. While, these practices aim at creating the necessary conditions for the 
efficiency to materialize as they arguably ensure the involvement and proper interaction of only suitable parts, 
actors and components (according to the system architect), authorities and courts cannot ignore the dangers of 
pervasive control. However, this article argues, in the context of systemic efficiencies they should resist 
underestimating the indispensable role of control in achieving coordination and coherence, without which the 
attempted combination, novelty, innovation, readjustment or other efficiency might collapse under its own 
complexity. The necessity of control is best exemplified in the contrasting fates of the once most popular 
architecture for accessing the Internet on mobile phones, the i-mode, which was a monumental success in Japan, 
but a failure in Europe and the US, largely because of the degree of control different telecom companies could 
exert on the system.  
The tension between the large benefits of systemic efficiencies and the large losses from otherwise 
potentially anti-competitive acts that may be necessary for systemic efficiencies to arise, make them an important 
and difficult topic to handle. Also, since the concept and implications of systemic efficiencies remain the same 
irrespective of jurisdiction, any lessons and conclusions drawn from their study are applicable universally. This 
becomes particularly relevant with regard to large international corporations considering that they can often be 
dominant or engage in far-reaching agreements, and therefore be the subject of antitrust investigations or 
regulation for the same behaviour in multiple jurisdictions. For example, this article discusses the recent influential 
cases of Google and IBM in both the US and the EU, where the invocation of systemic efficiencies can be (could 
have been) decisive for the outcome of the cases and the shape of their respective industry. 
These issues will be addressed in sequence: Part II introduces the concept and function of systemic 
efficiencies, and explains why their attainment can be problematic for the reason of being linked to extensive 
control. It goes on to prove the necessity of pervasive control over the production process in achieving systemic 
efficiencies. Part III documents what the author sees as the main positive effects that can flow out of systemic 
efficiencies, which are unlikely to result from smaller scale, simpler or insular efficiencies. This is why systemic 
efficiencies are qualitatively different and deserve separate consideration and evaluation. The final part, Part IV, 
presents examples of how systemic efficiencies materialize in real cases. The point is not to exonerate the firms 
from wrongdoing, but rather to highlight offsetting benefits (i.e. the systemic efficiencies) that would otherwise 
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escape the attention of competition authorities and courts. The overall idea is to introduce systemic efficiencies 
as a distinct type of efficiency, raise awareness as to their importance, and help authorities and regulators assess 
them.  
 
II. SYSTEMIC EFFICIENCIES AND THEIR FUNCTION IN COMPETITION LAW 
 
A. The Concept of Systemic Efficiencies 
 
Efficiencies as a justification for potentially anticompetitive firm conduct is a troubled concept, but one that can 
be of the utmost redeeming value to powerful firms. Efficiencies come at play as a mechanism to defend practices 
that competition authorities and courts would otherwise deem problematic in the market context and, absent any 
offsetting efficiencies, they may be condemned. 
Proving efficiencies has been and remains notoriously elusive, which may explain why there have been 
few²if any indeed²cases where anticompetitive conduct was successfully justified on the grounds of 
efficiencies (with the exception of mergers).5 That said, great progress has been made in understanding 
efficiencies, and we owe much of it to the formalization of antitrust analysis by the Chicago School during the 
second half of the previous century.6 Unlike the Harvard School, which regarded the possibility of positive effects 
flowing out of seemingly anti-competitive acts with suspicion, the Chicago School offered a structured analysis 
in defence of exercising market power, which resulted in higher tolerance toward several practices that used to be 
considered on their face pernicious (per se illegal).7 
There is no authoritative definition of efficiencies.8 As a general matter, they can be economic, technical 
or of other nature as long as they are linked to either technical progress, or economization of resources, or 
enhancement of a product, service or production method.9 Efficiencies are a relevant consideration in both 
agreements and unilateral conduct. In US case law efficiencies are mentioned in cases that involve both Section 
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, and while in the EU only Article 101(3) TFEU mentions technical progress explicitly, 
it is accepted that efficiencies are to be taken into account in 102 TFEU cases as well.10 This makes sense: similarly 
to the underpinning rationale of Article 101(3), powerful firms may sometimes need to unilaterally resort to 
practices whose side effect is to potentially harm the competitive process, but such practices should be tolerated²
even encouraged²if they can result in proportionate offsetting benefits to competition or consumers.11  
Efficiencies can emerge anywhere in the value chain and can range from trivial localized enhancements to 
drastic extensive interventions. The latter is close to what can be called a systemic efficiency. Systemic 
efficiencies are those that involve and affect multiple and dispersed parts of a system, which are highly 
interconnected, so that changes in one component require substantial modifications in other components 
throughout the system or a readjustment of the whole system. Systemic efficiencies thus hint to a more integrative 
and less linear approach, which emphasizes the interdependence between components, rather than insular 
enhancements, no matter how significant.12  
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By nature, systemic efficiencies are associated with large complex systems that comprise several 
constituent parts and exhibit extensive interdependencies among them. These systems are most commonly referred 
WRDVODUJHWHFKQLFDOV\VWHPV/76QDPHO\ODUJH³FRKHUHQWVWUXctures comprised of interacting, interconnected 
FRPSRQHQWV´13 or complex products and systems (CoPS), a similar type that is characterized by a large number 
of specialized components and sub-systems, that are usually hierarchically organized and present a high degree 
of engineering intensity and technological novelty.14  
Large complex systems can occur in various industries that exhibit the above-mentioned characteristics. 
Common examples include aircraft engines, electricity grids, intelligent buildings, railway systems, but also 
telecommunications and electronic network systems.15 The organizational authority behind such systems can be 
a single firm, or a collection of actors, and a number of systems can coexist in a market. For example, we have 
more than one networks in the electronic communications market, each constituting a system of its own, but still 
interconnected with each other. 
In such industries, the production function is often built around projects, which are necessary to organize 
the various assets and components as well as manage the extensive interactions throughout the system.16 In such 
production processes improvements in isolated components are likely to have only limited impact on overall 
performance; true efficiencies occur at the level that involves the entire project network or at least a major part 
thereof.17 By doing so, systemic efficiencies can best reflect and take advantage of thH V\VWHP¶Vcomponents, 
breadth of knowledge, skills, disparate technologies, and management across those elements. 
What brings those elements together is a mechanism of control in the frames of the structure that is assumed 
by the system.18 In that sense the various elements underpin the efficiency, but it is the control mechanism that 
enables it by orchestrating their interactions. While control is both necessary and beneficial in this context, it can 
raise competition concerns. Its role and implications are discussed right below.  
 
B. Pervasive Control as a Prerequisite of Systemic Efficiencies and as a Source of Anticompetitive 
Concerns 
 
If systemic efficiencies were purely beneficial, in the sense that in the process of introducing enhancements they 
did not negatively affect any competitors or the structure of the market, then a competition case would not arise 
at all, and systemic efficiencies would not need to be raised as an issue (in policy, regulatory or academic circles 
alike). The problem is that, often, for systemic efficiencies to emerge the introducing firm must exercise pervasive 
control over the production process and/or value chain, which in turn can affect the positioning of competitors in 
the market as well as the structure of the industry, and trigger the response of competition authorities or regulators. 
As will be shown in the following paragraphs this type of extensive control can be a prerequisite for the success 
of the systemic efficiency (and the project), and therefore, assuming that the systemic efficiency under scrutiny is 
desirable, it should be tolerated. But before we get to that part it is worth pausing for a moment to consider why 
pervasive control, as linked to efficiencies, may be a problem. 
The most common manifestation of control/influence over the value chain is control of prices or output. 
This is also the most traditional source of worry for competition authorities. Indeed, the textbook reason to curb 
monopolists or dominant firms is their ability to price above marginal cost or to limit output.19 But these are hardly 
the only ways by which a firm can shape the production process, value chain and ultimately the market to match 
its needs and strategy. Since the production of even the simplest product or service requires the bringing together 
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of various assets (physical assets, capital, know-how etc.), a firm can affect the production chain by exercising 
control over inputs or distribution channels, which can be done in a variety of ways such as integration, refusal to 
deal,20 tying, and exclusive dealing.22 All of these practices define boundaries, partnerships, and competitors. They 
DUHDILUP¶VZD\WR choose desired partners, while excluding others, and while normally this is acceptable,23 the 
exercise of control in the market can have multifarious repercussions, LQFOXGLQJUDLVLQJULYDOV¶FRVWV24 foreclosure 
of competitors,25 and raising entry barriers.26 These can result in rival firms being completely or partly unable to 
access an essential input (product or service), distribution channel, or customers; being forced to exit the market; 
or being forced to turn to inferior or more costly alternatives.27 
In all of those cases authorities and regulators might want to limLWWKHUHDFKRIWKHGRPLQDQWILUP¶VFRQWURO
over inputs or the production process/chain. They can do so, for example, by mandating access or interoperability, 
which would force the dominant firm to share its products or services with competitors who could then compete 
on more equal grounds. %XW WKH LPSRUWDQW TXHVWLRQ KHUH LV ZKHWKHU ZHDNHQLQJ D ILUP¶V FRQWURO over its own 
products, services or production process, would at the same time risk corrupting any efficiencies that emerge only 
through and because of strict control that excludes unwanted partners and arrangements.28 If that is the case, then 
the benefits of facilitating rivals should be balanced against the benefits of enabling the efficiency. The stakes 
become higher when the efficiency in question is systemic, because, as will be discussed below,29 they tend to be 
associated with significant payoffs. It is therefore essential to understand the necessity of control in the 
achievement of systemic efficiencies, both because it justifies its permissibility, and because it highlights the 
repercussions to systemic innovations of eliminating it. In this direction, systems organizations theory can provide 
valuable insights. 
In systems organization theory, there are mainly two ways to structure a system: integral and modular.30 
Integral systems exhibit a formal structure of interdependence among components, which are customized to match 
each other in terms of physical and functional characteristics so that components are from the beginning designed 
to fit together as parts of a whole system whose structure and operation are known in advance.31 This makes it 
hard for integral systems to accommodate change, scaling, and expansion. For the ICT sector in particular, these 
are important features, and therefore integral architectures are not preferable, especially for large systems.  
Modular systems, on the other hand, comprise components that are independent from each other in the 
sense that they are (can be) developed without regard to other components as long as they adhere to standardized 
interface specifications.32 They group similar or closely interdependent functions into modules (e.g. applications, 
hardware components), and then have modules communicate with each other through standardized interfaces (e.g. 
APIs, protocols).33 The idea is that operations and complexity inside each module are invisible to other modules, 
and only the relevant information for other modules is passed along through the interfaces.  
This organization facilitates structuring and management because it breaks down the system into smaller 
parts, isolates them from the overall complexity, and embeds the rules of operation into the system. Because the 
internal operation of each part is vested only in itself, local management and control can also be vested in each 
part individually. This allows control to be decentralized.34 There can be many benefits to decentralized control, 
and indeed many systems of production have opted for the decentralized model in varying degrees; for example, 
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 Id. 
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 VISCUSI, HARRINGTON, AND VERNON, supra note 19 at 258±66. 
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 United States c. Colgate and Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). 
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STRATEG. MANAG. J. 63, 65±66 (1996). 
32
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Modularity in the Design of Complex Engineering Systems,  in COMPLEX ENGINEERED SYSTEMS SE-9 175, 199 (Dan Braha, Ali A Minai, & 
Yaneer Bar-Yam eds., 2006). 
34
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in the ICT industry applications and operating systems can be independent and separately controlled modules, but 
they can still work together thanks to standardized interfaces.  
However, despite the option of decentralized control, sometimes firms choose to retain greater control even 
in modular systems, because it helps with the achievement of efficiencies through coherence, integration, strategy 
and appropriation.35 As Brusoni has noted, even when the division of labour is such that can lead to a modular 
structure of the iQGXVWU\ ³NQRZOHGJH-LQWHJUDWLQJ´ ILUPV might still be necessary to identify and solve more 
complex or generalized problems.36 
Control can achieve several objectives. First, it allows the system manager to efficiently design the system 
and the overall modular structure in the first place by determining the boundaries of modules (³breaking points´), 
picking appropriate modules, excluding others, linking modules together, and generally defining module 
interactions.37 This ensures a prima facie assurance that the system components will fit in well together and that 
work allocation has been performed optimally.  
Second, to the extent that the system is not left completely stagnant, the system will require constant 
supervision and updating to keep up with new functionality and requirements. While some updates will be minor 
and will fall within the automated design process, others will require more extensive changes and perhaps the 
resolution of conflicts (see below IV.A), that are unable to take place without the intervention of the system 
designer. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, control allows system architects to bring together various elements 
that go beyond physical assets/modules. A long line of scholarship on firm structure and integration documents 
how innovations, efficiencies and the competitive advantage are not only the result of the combination of physical 
assets/modules that can be linked together through rules and interfaces, but also draw from complementarities and 
interactions among other elements such as knowledge, skills, objectives, vision,38 managerial direction,39 and 
human capital that cannot necessarily be reduced to substitutable parts that one can readily purchase from the 
market or put in a blueprint.40 By exercising control over all those constituent parts system designers can ensure 
WKDWWKH\ELQGWKHPWRJHWKHULQD³WHDPSURGXFWLYHSURFHVV´41 This added value that comes with highly controlled 
(sometimes called closed) systems endows a system with a certain culture, a set of competencies and routines, 
which are not only transactional or organizational, but also technological (i.e. the particular selection or 
configuration of an organization's technological base), and serve as a unifying force that stitches together the 
system's resources and capabilities into a harmonious whole.42 
With large complex systems the previously-mentioned conditions and effects are magnified, because the 
more parts a system of production involves the harder modularization becomes and the higher the risk of poor 
results. In such cases a controlling authority with system-wide reach can enhance the process of selection and 
combination of parts and resources to achieve what Schilling calls synergistic specificity, a state where resources 
optimally fit together and complement each other to maximize each other's functionality and utility.43 Otherwise, 
some parts may behave individualistically, optimizing locally to the expense of the global optimum.  
This trade-off between the prioritization of local and system-wide (global) efficiency is a well-known 
GHEDWHLQWKHFLUFOHVRIWHFKQRORJLVWV$V6N\WWQHUQRWHV³LIHDFKsubsystem, regarded separately, is made to operate 
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with maximum efficiency, the system as a whole will not operate with utmost efILFLHQF\´HPSKDVLVDGGHG44 
Large complex systems are prone to this kind of weakness because they are made up of several subsystems. While 
each subsystem may have been designed with its own internal architecture and efficiency rules, the system 
superstructure is largely dependent on the interactions of the subsystems with each other. This is why the element 
of a control authority, which can supervise the entire system and coordinate the subsystems to serve a common 
interest, is so prominent in large complex systems.45 To ask that a measure in one part of a system be implemented 
without regard to collateral effects in other parts would perhaps solve a problem locally but jeopardize the health 
and efficiency of the system generally.46 
These considerations highlight the link between systemic efficiencies and pervasive control that can 
potentially disadvantage rivals by excluding them from a system. One might reasonably ask whether pervasive 
control is always necessary to bring about systemic effects. Some scholars appear to cast doubt on that conclusion: 
for instance, de Laat suggests that the development of DVDs (which he sees as a systemic innovation²see infra 
Part III.A for the relationship between systemic efficiencies and systemic innovations) was the result of looser 
alliances rather than of a closely knit system,47 while Robertson and Langlois note that the success of the personal 
computer architecture, which revolved around the Windows/DOS and Intel platforms, was attributable to the fact 
that no single firm controlled the development of the architecture.48 
A closer look however, shows that in both cases, the element of control and coordination was present, just 
not vested in a single authority or at all times. In the DVD standard development control and coordination was 
exercised by the leader(s) of the rival alliances (Toshiba, and Philips and Sony),49 and the personal computer 
architecture was chosen by IBM, which relied on Intel processors and Microsoft operating systems as the main 
components, later to be followed by Compaq.50 It is therefore true that systemic efficiencies do not necessarily 
arise in the frames of a single unified firm or even conglomerate, but it seems that there is always a source of 
control that serves as the coordination and focusing mechanism for the project, at least until the product or service 
acquires its basic characteristics.51  
A notable exception is the Internet, which has all the characteristics of a systemic innovation, but no single 
point of centralized control or direction. While the Internet clearly defies the theory laid down herein, its origins 
as a non-commercial innovation and its subsequent repurposing by a multitude of actors once it became public 
may explain the uniqueness of the case.  
Furthermore, even in those rare cases that one can generate systemic effects in the absence of centralized 
control, it may be difficult to translate those qualities in a systemic efficiency that can successfully be 
commercialized, if there is no coordinating direction or control. Linux, for example, is a system with limited 
centralized authority (but not complete lack thereof²see infra Part III.B), which has been met with low desktop 
adoption even though it has been around for decades.52 Part of the reason is that there are so many variants of it 
with so many different directions, features and priorities, that it is hard of any of them individually to build the 
critical mass and momentum necessary to earn the endorsement of OEMs, application developers, and ultimately 
users.53 
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The main point here is not to discredit open, decentralized systems with loose control mechanisms; their 
value and contribution to innovation and industry evolution are undisputed.54 The goal was to show that for certain 
types of activities and objectives tight control is indeed indispensable. Acknowledging this is particularly crucial 
in systems that are otherwise open, because the exercise of control in an open system²especially if control is 
gradually expanding²may be seen as a threat to the inclusiveness of the system. The fear is that the system 
initially benefits from openness and expansion, but then once it is established, it expands control and its 
participants and components are locked in, and perhaps manipulated by the control mechanism. The analysis 
above suggests another (better?) strategic reason behind pervasive control. In the following part I move on to 
discuss how systemic efficiencies that emerge thanks to pervasive control materialize in concrete benefits not only 
for the introducing firm, but for society more generally.  
  
III. THE SIGNIFICANT BENEFITS OF SYSTEMIC EFFICIENCIES 
 
As if efficiencies were not abstract enough and difficult to capture, prove or quantify, systemic efficiencies appear 
even more elusive. This begs the question of whether systemic efficiencies have indeed anything to contribute to 
the analysis of justifications for potentially anticompetitive behaviour. In answering positively, this part shows 
that systemic efficiencies should be seriously considered in assessing the overall effect of seemingly 
anticompetitive practices as they can advance goals that competition law cares about through ways that appear to 
be qualitatively different than what smaller scale or simpler efficiencies could contribute. 
In that vein systemic efficiencies can be associated with two goals that competition law occupies itself 
with. First, they can generate systemic innovations²the kind that emerges only through the interaction of a large 
number of interconnected elements (including, as per above, capital, labour, human capital, and physical 
resources). Innovation, or in other words dynamic efficiency, is a well-established objective of competition law,55 
and systemic innovations as a distinct type contribute in that direction. Second, they can generate and maintain 
value in an ecosystem, which, is not confined to the introducing firm, but rather spills over to the entire ecosystem. 
In that sense the contribution of the efficiency is not value through progress enjoyed primarily by the introducing 
firm, but also (perhaps mainly) by the industry in which the firm belongs,56 which raises total welfare²also an 
accepted goal of competition law.57  
 
A. The Transformation of Systemic Efficiencies into Systemic Innovations 
 
As mentioned, systemic efficiencies emerge through the interaction of a large number of elements and components 
dispersed across the organizational structure of a system. Similar to other efficiencies they can result in cost 
reduction or output expansion, but they become more relevant in the achievement of technical progress and the 
development of new products and services. In that direction they can result in localized innovations, but they can 
also account for a qualitatively different type of innovations, i.e. systemic innovations.  
Systemic innovations have been dealt with in the economics and management literature under various 
names. They are commonly called systemic, architectural or generalized and are distinguished from their opposite 
autonomous, modular or local innovations. In systemic innovations changes in (at least) one component of a 
system cause the need for substantial modifications in other components throughout the system.58 Henderson and 
Clark use the similar term architectural innovations, and define them as those where when the linkages between 
                                                          
54
 For a summary of pros and cons of open and proprietary systems see Schilling, id. 
55
 See, e.g., Brodley Joseph, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technoclogical Progress, 62 NEW YORK 
UNIV. LAW REV. 1020 (1987). 
56
 This is an important point because efficiencies should be objective, not just a private benefit to the introducing firm. See Case C-382/12 P 
Mastercard v. Commission, [2012] EU:C:2014:2201, para. 234.  
57
 Robert Lande, &KLFDJR¶V)DOVH)RXQGDWLRQ:HDOWK7UDQVIHUV1RW-XVW(Ificiency) Should Guide Antiturst, 58 ANTITRUST LAW J. 631, 638 
et seq. (1989). 
58
 David J Teece, Technological Change and the Nature of the Firm,  in TECHNICAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC THEORY (Giovanni Dosi et al. 
eds., 1988); Richard N Langlois, Economic Change and the Boundaries of the Firm, 44 J. INSTITUTIONAL THEOR. ECON. 635 (1988); Andrew 
Davies, The Life Cycle of a Complex Product System, 1 INT. J. INNOV. MANAG. 229 (1997). 
9 
 
components in a system change they cause an overall readjustment of the system.59 These types of innovations 
are in contrast to simpler, more localized innovations that can be introduced in a system without modifying other 
components of the system or rearranging the links between components.  
6LQFH WKH\ DIIHFW D PXOWLWXGH RI D V\VWHP¶V SDUWV PRVW RIWHQ V\VWHPLF LQQRYDWLRQV DOVR UHSUHVHQW D
significant departure from the current state of the system or of the technological status quo, as components need 
to adapt and be rearranged to ensure compatibility and cooperation with the new technological structure.60 They 
are therefore so to speak radical (also known as revolutionary, breakthrough, discontinuous, or disruptive), and 
are distinguished from incremental innovations (also known as evolutionary, continuous, or sustaining).61 The 
PDLQFKDUDFWHULVWLFRIUDGLFDOLQQRYDWLRQVLVWKDWWKH\³VZHHSDZD\PXFKRI>DQRUJDQL]DWLRQ
V@H[LVWLQJLQvestment 
LQ WHFKQLFDO VNLOOV DQG NQRZOHGJH GHVLJQV SURGXFWLRQ WHFKQLTXH SODQW DQG HTXLSPHQW´62 7KH\ DUH ³JDPH
FKDQJHUV´63 and can result in new technologies, products, services or even new markets.64 This distinguishes them 
from incremental innovations whLFKLQYROYHPHUH³DGDSWDWLRQUHILQHPHQWDQGHQKDQFHPHQWRIH[LVWLQJSURGXFWV
DQGRUSURGXFWLRQDQGGHOLYHU\V\VWHPV´65 Incremental innovations introduce minor changes, do not depart from 
the status quo and therefore often reinforce existing designs in products and services.66  
Because systemic innovations involve a multitude of parts in a system, they often require an effective 
focusing mechanism to ensure their proper interaction and cooperation. The kind of pervasive control described 
previously is capable of bringing together those parts and nurture the proper conditions for their interaction, absent 
which the (systemic) innovation might not arise. In other words, the exercise of control is the catalytic element 
for bringing coordination, cohesion, management and asset interaction to the necessary efficiency levels to allow 
the systemic innovation to materialise. In lack thereof, components might be only loosely joint preventing the 
interactions from leading up to a confluence that will result in the systemic innovation. 
This link between efficient control in a system and the systemic innovation that emerges thereof is 
beautifully exemplified in the contrasting fates of the development and success of i-mode in Japan and in Europe 
and the US. i-mode was the prevailing and a rather revolutionary architecture for accessing Internet content in the 
pre- and early 3G era, that was largely developed and sponsored by NTT DoCoMo, Japan's incumbent and flagship 
carrier.67 It consisted of a collection of protocols, interfaces, compatible devices, servers, payment methods, and 
affiliated content providers, all designed together towards building a completely new ecosystem.68 i-mode proved 
very successful in Japan, but failed to gain traction in other countries and particularly European countries and the 
US.69 
Case studies that compared i-mode in Japan and in other countries uniformly show that a crucial reason 
why DoCoMo succeeded in creating an i-mode ecosystem is because it was more effective in putting together all 
of the i-mode components, and dictating an integrated mode of operation.70 By doing so, DoCoMo managed to 
generate a widely adopted and innovative internet access architecture, where other operators failed. In the words 
of the managing director for i-mode's stratHJ\ ³>W@KH GHFLVLYH GLIIHUHQFH LV WKDW QHLWKHU WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV QRU
Europe has had a telecommunications provider like DoCoMo with the will to grow a new business and service 
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EDVHGRQDFRPSUHKHQVLYHYLHZRIWKHHFRV\VWHPDVDZKROH´71 In Japan, the telecommunications industry was 
structured in a way that accorded a lot of power to the three main operators and especially DoCoMo as the largest 
operator, as opposed to Europe where power was more evenly divided between operators, device manufacturers 
and standard setting organizations.72 The pan-European dominance of the GSM consortium and Nokia, in contrast 
with the fragmented national markets in which operators were confined, meant that operators lacked the power to 
direct and control the creation of the necessary standards, interfaces, protocols and devices that were essential to 
the operation of i-mode. 
In contrast to Europe, DoCoMo was well positioned to make several technical decisions about the elements 
and components that made i-mode work: it excluded WAP from the initial version of i-mode and mandated the 
use of the more flexible cHTML (compact HTML) for content creation, it set the specifications for the handsets 
that would be sold as i-mode compatible (including the interfaces, menus and dedicated i-mode buttons) shutting 
out manufacturers that did not adhere to the strict requirements, and it developed and mandated the use of a 
specific micropayment system.73 The result was that the elements that made up i-mode in Japan were much more 
integrated with each other and provided the much needed compatibility and reliability that both users and 
service/application/content creators needed in order to adopt it. 
Bearing in mind the fates of the different implementations of i-mode one should note that absent the 
efficiencies generated by DoCoMo's pervasive control, the i-mode architecture would have likely never become 
successful. In that sense, it would never constitute an ³innovation´ at all, or at best it would be a failed innovation. 
It is a fine line to notice, but systemic efficiencies can be an indispensable driver behind the emergence and success 
of a systemic innovation. 
 
B. Raising Total Welfare Through Ecosystem Value Creation and Maintenance 
 
Building and maintaining an ecosystem made up of numerous devices, services, infrastructure and other 
components is not an easy task. For instance, the ICT sector's recent history offers examples of platforms, around 
which a miscellany of actors and components revolved forming an ecosystem that emerged and faded in a matter 
of only a few years (e.g. Symbian, i-mode in Europe and US). 
Without suggesting that it is the only reason behind an ecosystem's demise, the lack of coherence and 
coordination to ensure that all parts fit in well together, plays an instrumental role. As explained earlier, an elevated 
measure of control can be critical in achieving the required degree of cooperation, even if that means the 
occasional disadvantage of rivals. As an ecosystem's size or complexity increases, coordination becomes more 
challenging, and more drastic measures may need to be adopted in that direction. This part shows how such end-
to-end control and the managing (read: limiting) of competition within the boundaries of ecosystems can help 
them generate and maintain value for the system sponsor and for the broader market alike.  
Much like with the concept of efficiencies in general, it may sound paradoxical that restricting competition 
within a system can be positive for the broader market. But management and economics theories, including 
platform studies and compatibility theories, have well demonstrated how vesting control in a single entity that sits 
in the middle of a large complex system and manages competition can yield benefits for all other actors and 
ultimately consumers as well, even if some actors are individually harmed.  
In their famous book, The Keystone Advantage, Iansity and Levien popularized the idea that certain firms 
in an ecosystem become more central than others, in that actors and value coalesce around them, and in that their 
behaviour can therefore have profound effects on the health of the entire network (examples the authors discuss 
include retailer Walmart and technology company Microsoft).74 By nature of their central function, these 
keystones amass great power and exert great influence. Critical to the success of keystone firms and by extension 
RIWKHHFRV\VWHPDURXQGWKHPLVWKDWWKHLU³LQWHUHVWVDUHDOLJQHGZLWKWKRVHRIWKHHFRV\VWHPDVDZKROH´75 Their 
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actions are not animated by selfishness or greed; they are rather aimed at the general welfare of their ecosystem, 
EHFDXVH³WKHPRVWGLUHFWZD\IRUDNH\VWRQHWRHQVXUHLWVFRQWLQXHGVXUYLYDOLVWRGLUHFWO\PDLQWDLQWKHVWDELOLW\RI
LWVHFRV\VWHP´76 And they can do this in a variety of ways including by removing actors or limiting their number 
in the ecosystem, by managing competition within the ecosystem and by providing a stable platform for the rest 
to build upon.77 Under this light, the exercise of end-to-end control, the promotion of certain actors, links and 
EHKDYLRXUDQGWKHH[FOXVLRQRIRWKHUVEHFRPHDQHFHVVDU\DQGHIIHFWLYHZHDSRQLQWKHNH\VWRQH¶VDUVHQDO 
In a way, keystones often act as benevolent dictators for life (BDFL), a term that was coined to describe 
leaders who retain the final say and ultimate authority even in systems that are otherwise open, inclusive, 
decentralized and non-hierarchical (e.g. open source software).78 Such actors, who maintain central and overriding 
authority, either officially or de facto, can become indispensable for the overall health of the ecosystem, even if 
that means that their decisions and actions will harm some other players in the ecosystem.79 
,DQVLWLDQG/HYLHQ¶VNH\VWRQHWKHRU\UHIOHFWVDOVRLQVLJKWVIURPWKHSODWIRUPVOLWHUDWXUHZKLFKVLPLODUO\
identifies centres of gravity in platform ecosystems and the role the platform owner performs in that context.80 In 
their highly influential work Baldwin and Woodard explain that in any given platform system and at any given 
time only a few parts and components will be those that define its general architectural shape.81 These do not 
necessarily remain the same as the platform evolves, but there always seems to be a centre of gravity in platform 
ecosystems, which determines the overall direction, behaviour, and management of the key actors and 
components, and ultimately the ecosystem.82 
One way whereby platform owners (or sponsors, designers, architects etc) attempt to maximize their 
chances of success is by exercising control on who gets access to the platform, and in technical systems they can 
do that by leveraging compatibility between actors and/or components.83 There is rich literature on how managing 
(in)compatibility within and between platform systems can generate value and enhance competition, entry and 
innovation.84 This is not to say that exclusion through incompatibility is always superior to compatibility,85 but 
rather that, unlike popular belief, making a system highly selective by shutting out actors and components can 
also be the source of significant benefits.  
Two reasons explain this: first, under incompatibility and before a standard has been selected by the market, 
potential candidates (actors, components, systems) compete against each other with the goal to become the de 
facto industry standard or model.86 This type of competition where actors strive to dominate the market based on 
different models is characterized as competition for the market rather than competition in the market, and is 
recognized as a substantial form of competition.87 A platform system that chooses to discriminate against or block 
rivals and their components may be doing so to establish itself as the paradigmatic system in the market, and this 
process of systems going against each other can still give rise to valuable effective competition.88 
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Second, under incompatibility, it is easier for components in each system (e.g. applications) to maintain 
relative market power, because they do not compete directly with those of rival systems only with those within 
the same system. This results in lower competitive intensity than if systems were compatible (in which case similar 
components from all systems would compete against each other), which in turn slows down the commoditization 
of competitors.89 The softening of competition can be positively associated with higher innovation and entry: what 
today seems to be the predominant theory in the relationship between competition and innovation, is that 
competition is initially positively correlated to innovation, but that too much competition can be harmful for 
innovation rates, as the relationship between competition and innovation is not monotonic.90 After a certain point, 
excessive competition may have an adverse effect on innovation as it leads to rapid depreciation of the innovation's 
value.91 The prospect of not recouping the cost of developing and commercializing an innovation as other actors 
would quickly imitate or render the original innovation obsolete might act as a discouraging factor.92  The friction 
between the two effects of competition results in an inverted U relationship where competition initially acts as the 
driving force of innovation, but when it gets too fierce it may hinder further entry.93 
Taken together, what economics and management theories demonstrate is that in markets that are built as 
ecosystems, where actors interact instead of products and services trickling down from producer to consumer, the 
active management of relationships and competition can well be beneficial. This may sometimes appear 
counterintuitive because it implies a deviation from free unfettered competition, but as explained it aims to 
disadvantage the few to promote the well-being of the many.  
 
IV. APPLICATION TO CASES 
 
As mentioned, systemic efficiencies result from the interaction of multiple parts of a system, and in that sense, to 
be noticed, they require an overview of the entire system. Their subtlety may make them invisible to competition 
authorities and courts causing in turn certain firm behaviour to appear less justifiable than if the countervailing 
systemic efficiencies were readily observable. This part demonstrates how systemic efficiencies materialize in 
practice, and what potential pro-competitive effects authorities and courts could associate with them. The correct 
identification of systemic efficiencies can be decisive in the outcome of a case, and ultimately the shape and 
performance of the industry. 
In that direction I discuss two high-profile sets of cases from the ICT industry: first, possible systemic 
efficiencies in the ongoing Google Android investigation opened by the European Commission in the EU and by 
the Federal Trade Commission in the US. Second, possible systemic efficiencies in the recent IBM mainframe 
cases also opened by the European Commission in the EU and the subject of multiple lawsuits in federal courts 
in the US.  
Besides demonstrating how systemic efficiencies play out in practice, the cases discussed below will 
hopefully also help readers understand what systemic efficiencies are not. This is important because not all 
efficiencies that occur in the context of complex technical systems are systemic, and distinguishing real systemic 
efficiencies IURP³VWDQGDUG´HIILFLHQFLHVis instrumental in preventing abuse of the concept. The Microsoft cases 
are helpful here. In the EU case, Microsoft claimed that tying Windows Media Player to the Windows operating 
system lowered transaction costs for users, and helped developers make use of media services by providing them 
with a media platform to which they could place calls through APIs.94 Regardless of whether these are indeed real 
efficiencies to begin with (the Commission rejected them),95 they definitely do not seem to be systemic: they 
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involve only few components, which are in fact localized, and changing their relationship or behaviour would not 
affect the operation of the system, whether that is defined to be the Windows operating system software, or the 
Windows ecosystem more broadly. Similarly, in the US case, Microsoft claimed that integrating Internet Explorer 
into Windows and using it as the default browser even overriding user preferences, was necessary to allow certain 
features of Windows Help and Windows Update.96 While the Court of Appeals upheld this defence,97 it should, 
again, be clear that this was not a systemic efficiency: the IE integration affected only specific software 
functionality in a limited number of cases, which did not have crucial influence on the architecture (technical or 
other) of the system as a whole. 
On the other hand, one should also be cautious when correctly identifying a systemic efficiency. The case 
studies below should not be read to mean that systemic efficiencies justify any and all business behaviour. They 
are meant to highlight the role of systemic efficiencies in the balancing test undertaken by authorities and courts 
to assist in the appreciation of practices that may appear anti-competitive but which in essence have far reaching 
effect, not immediately obvious. In that sense, firm conduct can still be found to be in violation of competition 
law if the anticompetitive effect outweighs the benefits of the systemic efficiency. 
 
A. The Google Android Cases in the EU and the US 
 
Google has recently been the subject of multiple monopolization/abuse of dominance investigations regarding its 
business practices. These include the company's search operations, which came under scrutiny both by the Federal 
Trade Commission in the US and by the European Commission in the EU,98 but also the company's Android and 
mobile apps strategy, which prompted a separate investigation by the EC and (at the time of writing) an unofficial 
probe by the FTC.99 This latter set of practices provides a good base for discussion on how the acknowledgement 
of systemic efficiencies can affect our understanding of the legitimacy of seemingly anti-competitive practices. 
*RRJOH¶V SUDFWLFHV, of course, may still be found illegal if potential anti-competitive effects overshadow the 
benefits of (systemic) efficiencies.  
In April 2015 the EC confirmed that it opened formal proceedings against Google to determine whether 
³Google has illegally hindered the development and market access of rival mobile operating systems, mobile 
communication applications and services in the European Economic Area.´100 The EC suggested that Google 
might have done so by ³requiring or incentivising smartphone and tablet manufacturers to exclusively pre-install 
*RRJOH¶VRZQDSSOLFDWLRQVRUVHUYLFHV´ by ³prevent[ing] smartphone and tablet manufacturers who wish to install 
Google's applications and services on some of their Android devices from developing and marketing modified 
and potentially competing versions of Android,´ and by ³tying or bundling certain Google applications and 
services distributed on Android devices with other Google applications, services and/or application programming 
interfaces of Google.´101 These limitations are imposed through $QGURLG¶V OLFHQFHV QDPHO\ WKH $QWL-
fragmentation Agreement (AFA) and the Mobile Application Distribution Agreement (MADA). These 
(voluntary) agreements ask manufacturers to adhere to a set of compatibility requirements, to refrain from 
developing competing Android-based operating systems, and to install certain Google Apps (alongside other 
apps).102 
These practices have something in common: they potentially prevent competing manufacturers of mobile 
operating systems and mobile applications from offering their products on fully equal grounds with those of 
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Google when they rely on the Android platform.103 But they cannot be said to be anti-competitive in the abstract. 
Rather, it must be proven that Google is dominant in the relevant markets, that it has abused its dominance (or 
monopolized or attempted to monopolize the relevant markets), and that no good justifications exist for such 
conduct. This last part is precisely where systemic efficiencies come in.  
Android comes in varying degrees of openness, from the fully open Android Open Source Project version, 
which anyone can modify and install on a mobile device, to the version sponsored by Google which comes with 
the limitations of the AFA and MADA mentioned before. Many manufacturers use Android as the operating 
system on their devices, with some estimates placing them in the range of 24,000 devices from 1,300 brands.104 
Compare that to the number of devices that run, for instance, $SSOH¶V L26ZKLFK LV IHZHU WKDQ ILIW\ DQGDOO
controlled by the same company. $QGURLG¶VVXFFHVV, as evidenced by its wide base of adoption, came with the 
high cost of extensive fragmentation. With such a large number of devices the complexity and heterogeneity of 
the Android ecosystem are not only hard to manage,105 they also threaten the very success of the ecosystem if they 
hinder its stability and²above all²evolution.106 In such situations a focusing mechanism that enhances cohesion 
can prove decisive in maintaining the health of the ecosystem for the reasons explained previously. Looking at it 
as a large complex system, the suggestion here is that Android necessitates *RRJOH¶V steering to prevent 
degeneration into a loose collection of interacting yet uncoordinated nodes.107   
For the layman, the cost of fragmentation is not readily visible. The average user interacts only with his 
own device oblivious to the PXOWLWXGHRIRWKHUGHYLFHVWKDWEHORQJLQWKHVDPHHFRV\VWHPDQGWRWKH³EDFNVWDJH´
of his end user experience. But competition authorities and courts should be able to appreciate that the 
management of fragmentation in the Android ecosystem is essential and requires constant supervision of at least 
three aspects: updates, security, and user experience. These aspects involve several parts in the ecosystem 
including the Android operating system, the applications that run on top, the applications distribution platform 
(e.g. Google Play), the hardware of the device on which the operating system and applications are installed and 
run, and the mobile network on which devices connect (hence the systemic element).108 Keeping fragmentation 
under control has to take into account the effects and implications of actions (re updates, security, and user 
experience) across all those loci; an update or a security feature that fails at any of these stages is not an update or 
feature at all. Collectively, the successful management of these aspects, spread over the various parts of the 
ecosystem, UHVXOWLQWKHV\VWHPLFHIILFLHQFLHVRIWKHV\VWHP¶VPDLQWHQDQFHDQGHYROXWLRQ,QWXUQWKLVLVZKDWZLOO
allow the system to innovate and stay ahead of competition, a welcome development from a competition law 
perspective. 
To pull this process together, as suggested by systems organization theory presented above,109 the system 
manager (i.e. Google) may need to exercise an elevated measure of control, which manifests itself, inter alia, 
through the very actions that competition authorities are scrutinizing.110 While these actions may create obstacles 
for competitors, they also aim to create a minimum standard of uniformity, cohesion, stability and evolution, as 
they ensure that the pieces of the Android ecosystem fit in optimally together, not only statically but dynamically 
as well.111 
Let us first focus on updates. In a static view of the Android ecosystem we can assume that all parts and 
components fit in well and perform optimally (something that in itself requires planning and will be discussed 
shortly below). But when a component changes²a common occurrence in the fast-paced environment of mobile 
communications²seamless interoperation with the rest of the system must be ensured, otherwise functionality 
will be broken. Localized insular updates (e.g. user interface of an application) are easy in that regard, because 
they do not interfere significantly with the operation of other parts. But more extensive updates, such as those that 
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involve the operating system or the hardware require more holistic planning because it must be determined 
whether the change should be performed at the module level, at the group of modules (subsystem) level, or at the 
system level, and any conflicts and interdependencies (a process that is commonly done using the so called Design 
Structure Matrix) must be resolved.112 This requires a degree of coordination between and control over the 
implicated modules if the management mechanism deems that selective updates in one regard or part without 
corresponding updates to another will not bring about the goal and purpose of the update.113 Apple, for example, 
integrates the hardware (iPhone), with the operating system (iOS) and the distribution platform (App Store) to 
achieve a consistent and reliable product as well as effective implementation and commercialization of 
innovations. Google only partially has this kind of pervasive control: for instance, the requirement of pre-installing 
the complete Google app suite, which can potentially exclude developers of similar and competing applications, 
applies only to manufacturers that sign the (optional) MADA; the rest are free to release Android compatible 
devices with other non-Google applications pre-installed. One of the reasons for the full line strategy is to ensure 
that the essential set of applications that Google promotes (which in themselves are modules) evolve hand in hand, 
and that an update in one module (including the operating system) is reflected in updates to the rest of the set 
without discontinuities in functionality.114   
Further, a systemic analysis of the Android ecosystem suggests that it can derive significant benefits from 
greater homogenization through the wider adoption of an ³RIILFLDO´ YHUVLRQ RI $QGURLG or highly compatible 
versions of Android. Along those lines Google has invited scrutiny IRUIRUFLQJ³FRPSDWLEOH´YHUVLRQVRI$QGURLG 
onto manufacturers to the expense of independent forks HJ $PD]RQ¶V )LUH IRUN. While the potential anti-
competitive harms here are easy to see (i.e. foreclosure), it is worth considering the more subtle systemic benefits 
as well: a unified update process speeds up dissemination of new features and facilitates testing and error 
detection. Today, when Google releases an update to the Android core, the various manufacturers have to 
separately test every update to make sure it is compatible with a variety of different phone configurations, and 
with their own implementation of Android.115 Subsequently, network operators have to further test it for 
compatibility with their networks as new features can present stability or security threats to the highly managed 
cellular networks.116 These tests add significant delays to the evolution of the Android ecosystem, create an 
overhead of testing requirements to ensure compatibility, and pull the operating system in multiple directions.117 
Apple, on the contrary, having internalized the process can afford to skip many of those tests, saving it time, 
creating consistency, and allowing for the undistracted planning and execution RI WKHFRPSDQ\¶V L26VWUDWHJ\
(Microsoft mutatis mutandis). 118 
Similar justifications explain why placing some restrictions around the formation of the end user 
H[SHULHQFHFDQEHHIIHFWLYHWRFRXQWHU$QGURLG¶VIUDJPHQWDWLRQ2ne of the common reasons why the iPhone has 
been so successful is that it ³simply works´ meaning that the out-of-the box experience of iPhone users is smooth, 
consistent and lacking the need for customization.119 Similarly, the MADA, by maintaining a list of minimum 
applications and default home screen layouts, aims at offering a uniform and familiar end user experience free 
from potential breaking points. What is most important here is not so much the likelihood that third parties may 
actually break the system, but rather that Google's strategy appeals also to those users that do not even want to 
have to assess this possibility themselves. By picking the Android experience those users would like to forego the 
transaction costs of verifying the quality of the product and instead opt for an off-the-shelf end product/service 
that has taken care of all issues of compatibility, cross-functionality and interoperation for them.120 
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For instance, one of the requirements of the MADA is that manufacturers have to pre-install an entire suite 
of Google apps; they cannot pick and choose. Two of those applications are Gmail and Google Drive, and their 
complementarity is obvious: the integration of Google Drive with Gmail allows users to easily attach files to their 
emails and save attachments from their emails. It is not that this function cannot be performed by any other 
combination of applications, but the ready availability of such functionality increases Android¶VXVHIXOQHVV and 
user-friendliness, and therefore value. If one extrapolates from this example, it is easy to see how the restrictions 
placed by the MADA comprehensively help shape an environment that meets certain minimum standards but is 
still customizable and open to third parties, so that it can compete with the more integrated approach followed by 
$QGURLG¶VPDLQFRPSHWLWRUVLQFOXGLQJL26DQG:LQGRZV3KRQH 
Lastly, fragmentation takes its toll on the security aspects of the Android ecosystem as well. While all 
mobile operating systems have security flaws, Android's position is worsened by additional factors that could be 
resolved by a controlling authority with the power to filter out customizations that constitute a risk factor. 
However, this might be a problem for competition authorities, if one is to judge by the European Commission's 
suspicion that Google prevents manufacturers from developing competing versions of Android. 
As already mentioned, Google allows a very large margin of customization of Android, but it still reserves 
Google Play for manufacturers that have signed the MADA and have accepted *RRJOH¶VIXOODSSOLQH. One of the 
benefits of using Google Play is that Google is generally good at policing it for malware. Once it detects a harmful 
app, it removes it thereby protecting Android users and the Android ecosystem as a whole. However, malware 
can survive in less protected app distribution platforms, of which there are many, and while Google Play users 
will not be affected, the overall quality of the Android ecosystem is indeed harmed. 122 Indeed, evidence suggests 
that Google Play is more secure than other Android application distribution platforms.123 In turn, a more robust 
app distribution platform layer not only enhances security in the ecosystem built around Google Play, but creates 
positive externalities for the entire Android ecosystem as well, because it enhances its reputation and the 
perception users and developers have about it generally. 
Moreover, Android forks can expose users to vulnerabilities by failing to prevent apps and malware from 
accessing unauthorized functions.124 Android is a layered operating system consisting of an app layer, a framework 
layer, and the Linux kernel layer. To take advantage of a device's hardware features (e.g. GPS, camera, 
microphone etc) an app has to interface with the Linux kernel. To avoid exploitation of functions and features 
both the apps and the layers have to be protected from unauthorized uses. Badly designed layers can open the door 
for apps to compromise user security and privacy, and this is a common concern with modified versions of 
Android.125 The small time window manufacturers have to work on their own version of Android and the 
challenges the updating process presents described previously become a liability for the Android ecosystem 
because they expose it to security and privacy violations.126 In this context, promoting a more uniform version of 
Android which adheres to the standards Google sets through its licensing system, can help ameliorate these 
concerns. 
In all, the recognition of systemic efficiencies should allow authorities and courts to appreciate that 
Google¶V UHVWULFWLRQV taken together are not necessarily (only) about protecting individual components of the 
Android system (e.g. Play, Search), but about the well-being and evolution of the system and its relationship with 
users as a whole. This realization does not automatically mean that *RRJOH¶VEHKDYLRXUis overall pro-competitive, 
but it does illuminate a certain value in and rationale behind it that could otherwise remain hidden. The opportunity 
for a genuine appreciation of systemic efficiencies is reminiscent of the opportunity the Court of Appeals had and 
seized in the US Microsoft case, to recognize tying efficiencies in platform markets as different from those in non-
platform markets, which led the court to move the tying standard from per se illegal to rule of reason analysis.127 
The court did not say that tying in platforms is always justified, but it did point out that tying in platform markets 
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generates broader benefits that accrue not only to the firm that performs the tying, but also to third parties and 
therefore a more moderate rule of reason approach was in order.128 The idea here is that the systemic effect of 
GooglH¶VUHVWULFWLRQVWDNHQWRJHWKHUVKRXOGEHseparately valued too, for what they offer to the Android ecosystem 
(including developers and consumers). Whether the added value (on top of the separate value of each contractual 
arrangement) is enough to make Google¶V EHKDYLRXU SUR-competitive overall is a conclusion that a court or 
authority can only reach after assessing potential harms too. But this exercise is beyond the scope of this article.  
 
B. The IBM Mainframe Cases in the EU and the US 
 
As expected for large technology companies, IBM has not escaped antitrust scrutiny either. A series of recent EU 
and US cases that involved the company's mainframe computers highlighted again the fine line between 
acceptable business practices and anticompetitive exclusion, but bypassed an opportunity to show how 
exclusionary practices in the universe of large complex systems and firms can be linked to types of efficiencies 
that do not occur in smaller scale or more insular environments. Had they done so they would have provided a 
fuller understandiQJDQGDSSUHFLDWLRQRI,%0¶VSUDFWLFHVDQGWKHLQGXVWU\¶VQHHGVDQGVWUXFWXUH 
The cases covered a range of offenses but the exclusion part is common to all. In the EU, the Commission 
accused IBM of tying the sale of its mainframe computers with maintenance services thereby shutting out 
competition in the secondary market.129 In the US the case involved the refusal of IBM to extend interoperability 
between its products and those of rival firms making it impossible for them to offer competing solutions to 
companies that were using IBM's mainframes.130 The EU case was settled, and so we are lacking the details on 
the Commission's thinking regarding possible justifications for IBM's behaviour.131 The district court in the US 
upheld the established norm that in principle firms are free to partner with whomever they wish, and accepted that 
,%0¶VUHIXVDOWRVXSSO\DQGW\LQJSUDFWLFHV ZKLFKSDUWO\PDWHULDOL]HGWKURXJK,%0¶VUHIXVDOWRVXSSRUWLWVROGHU
S/390 mainframe series, and the tying of its new mainframe hardware to the z/OS software) were justified by 
,%0¶VLQWHUHVWWRSURWHFWLWVLQYHVWPHQWVLQLWVQHZ³]´PDLQIUDPHVHULHV. 
It is at this point that the court could and should have considered IBM's (potentially anti-competitive) 
policies as part of IBM's broader innovation cycles in its mainframe line of business, and not just as an isolated 
incident. This would highlight that the current mainframe line is part of a larger system from which it has evolved 
and which it extends, and it cannot be appreciated out of that context.  
The z mainframe model is not an insular product; it is the latest model in a long line of mainframe 
computers, which over the years became so successful that the IBM's brand name became almost synonymous 
with the market itself. It would not be a hyperbole to say that IBM created and maintained the market for 
mainframe computers for over 50 years through continuous innovations generating tremendous value and 
technical progress for the industry and society (and quite evidently IBM itself).132 Throughout this period IBM's 
business practices were not necessarily geared towards shielding IBM from competition, but also served to 
maintain and evolve a mainframe system through the years, not just a single model, but a whole line of them 
through recurrent innovations one drawing from the success of the previous ones. Under this light, to fully capture 
the rationale and effect of IBM's current practices, one has to regard them in perspective as part of the system in 
which they are born, namely the mainframe system in its historical dimension. 
 IBM's mainframe line was launched in 1964 with the S/360 model, which has been described as a $5 
billion gamble, and was the biggest corporate project investment at the time.133 The reason why the S/360 project 
was so risky and revolutionary was twofold: first, it was the first modular mainframe architecture, meaning that 
its various components (and peripherals) could be recombined throughout IBM's product line, unlike standard 
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practice which was to manufacture integrated machines. Second, while some hardware components were available 
in the market, IBM chose to develop and produce its own, to ensure maximum compatibility and reliability.134 
The S/360 was a complete departure from the then established technology, and IBM had to get systemic 
compatibility and reliability right, not only because the architecture of the S/360 was experimental and innovative 
(and thusly risky, untested, and potentially unstable), but also because its customers consisted of large 
corporations, institutions and government agencies with low tolerance for glitches and internal incompatibilities. 
This is why IBM chose to forego off-the-shelf hardware and keep its architecture closed. To ask that IBM open 
up its architecture to third parties (including hardware, software, training, and maintenance), as regulators and 
competitors unsuccessfully did,135 ZRXOGULVNWKHSURMHFW¶VFRUHdesign, as well as ,%0¶Vsurvival, reputation, and, 
as the keystone player in the mainframes market, the fate of the industry altogether. Indeed, the S/360 system 
sustained an entire ecosystem of other independent players in the industry, and it is telling that some commentators 
LGHQWLI\WKHHFRV\VWHP¶VHQGXULQJVXFFHVVDVRQHRIWKHfactors why IBM found it challenging to push out the next 
wave of innovation after the S/360.136 
IBM obviously had an interest in safeguarding its system and the market it created around it,137 but it was 
also in the long-run interest of the industry to allow IBM to create a new market through this revolutionary 
machine, even though in the short-run competitors would rather chip away IBM's profits by free-riding on its 
R&D and efforts to build the market.138 Indeed, IBM's strategy resulted in a product line that defined computer 
architecture for the next decades to such an extent that the mainframe market comprising IBM and other smaller 
rivals was sneeringly referred to as ³,%0DQGWKHVHYHQGZDUYHV.´139 For instance, motivated by the success of 
the S/360 system and hoping for its continuation, IBM designed and invested in the so called Future System 
project (FS). FS ultimately turned out to be a strategic failure, mainly because it was too ambitious and 
revolutionary for its time.140 But despite its failure, the project paved the way for far-reaching innovations (such 
as the use of integrated chips, the full separation of software and hardware, and the idea that computers should 
become adaptable to every and any operational environment), that were gradually integrated into the next 
generations of mainframe computers over the next decade, including models S/370 and S/390,141 the latter of 
which came out in 1990 and included fiber optics integration and, for the first time, open source software support.  
What is important to note here is that IBM decided to go forward with FS and the evolutions of the S/ 
series precisely because the S/360 succeeded in creating and locking in a market that justified taking immense 
business risks and making the necessary investments. Subsequent innovations maintained this trend. Around the 
time that S/390 came out in the early 90s some industry experts felt that mainframes are a thing of the past (one 
analyst wrote "I predict that the last mainframe will be unplugged on March 15, 1996.").142 Not only did that not 
happen but two decades later, the mainframe industry is still active even during the cloud era when for many 
maintaining centralized computer power seems backwards and inefficient, and IBM continues to be a frontrunner.  
,WZRXOGEHZURQJWRVD\WKDW,%0¶VFRQWLQXRXVLQQRYDWLRQZDYHVDUe the result of just the sheer size of its 
EXVLQHVVVSDQRU,%0¶V³EXOO\LQJ´SUDFWLFHV:KLOHWKHUHLVVRPHWUXWKWRWKDW143 ,%0¶VSURWHFWLYHSUDFWLFHVDOORZ
LWWRFRPSHWHRQLQQRYDWLRQEHFDXVHWKH\DUHLQWHUZRYHQZLWK,%0¶VFRUSRUDWHFXOWXUHRQLQQRYDWLRQ144 IBM is 
QRW WKH W\SLFDO ³LGOH´ PRQRSROLVW ZKR HQMR\V ³WKH TXLHW OLIH´ RQFH LW KDV VXFFHVVIXOO\ FRPPHUFLDOL]HG DQ
innovation. Five decades after the revolution of the S/360 it continues to take evolutionary steps each bringing 
together new hardware and software, and²combined²a whole ecosystem of mainframe computing. The 
systemic element here becomes obvious when one takes a higher level look from each particular mainframe model 
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and the software and hardware that developed around it to the uninterrupted progress and maintenance of the 
mainframe industry over a course of several decades through a series of IBM-controlled innovations.  
This combined effect and contribution, can well be greater than the individual innovations themselves, and 
should be separately appreciated by anyone that studies (or attempts to regulate) IBM's strategy in the market. 
-XVWE\PHDQVRIDQH[DPSOHWKHSHUVLVWHQWVXFFHVVRI,%0¶VSURGucts in many European markets (on top of the 
American one) was a main driving force behind the creaWLRQRIQDWLRQDOSURJUDPVWRLQKLELW,%0¶VGRPLQDWLRQ145 
By threating over a sustained period of time to become a foreign force domestically in a sensitive industry whereon 
governments relied on IBM prompted them to intensify their own home-grown computer programs. This kind of 
spill-RYHU HIIHFWV VWHPPLQJ IURP WDNLQJ D EURDGHU ORRN DW D V\VWHP¶V HYROXWLRQ DQG FRQWLQXRXV VXFFHVV DQG
innovations, are essential in accurately evaluating new products, services, or innovations, when considering 
imposing restraints as to how the company behind them is allowed to manage them. 
0\SXUSRVHKHUHLVQRWWRH[WRO,%0¶VFRUSRUDWHFXOWXUHRUVWUDWHJ\,WLVUDWKHUWRVKRZWKDW,%0¶VSURGXFW
and strategy choices have generated innovations and efficiencies that, put in a continuum, form part of a system, 
i.e. the mainframe computer and all its evolutions, and should not be seen separately just as individual products, 
services or functions, because doing so would overlook the added synergistic value they have contributed to the 
LQGXVWU\E\HVWDEOLVKLQJDQGPDLQWDLQLQJLW)RUWKLVUHDVRQ,%0¶VFKRLFHVDVDUHIOHFWLRQRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶VSURGXFW
and institutional philosophy, should be coated with the additional element of systemic efficiencies and 
innovations. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
A number of points were made in this article in hopes of assisting regulators, competition authorities and courts 
better assess certain practices that may appear anti-competitive if one does not account for a distinct type of 
efficiencies, namely systemic efficiencies. The article traced the characteristics of systemic innovations, explained 
why they may pose anti-competitive dangers, presented the distinctive benefits they generate which justify why 
they should be tolerated, and showed how they can be applied to high profile cases.  
While this article hopefully made a worthwhile attempt to demonstrate the value of systemic efficiencies 
in competition law analysis, it also acknowledges that systemic efficiencies are in tension with the tendency of 
courts and authorities to require efficiencies to be specific, likely, and provable. This is a fair requirement 
considering that firms have a reputation for making overbroad statements regarding alleged efficiencies. However, 
efficiencies, in all their fuzziness, have traditionally been at the forefront of pushing the boundaries of antitrust 
theory and practice. As we gain a better understanding of systems and their peculiar properties due their internal 
complexity, we should allow these insights to be reflected in antitrust theory and practice, for otherwise we are 
risking banning pro-competitive strategies, the same way we did half a century ago when efficiencies were first 
being discovered. 
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